Why Confirm Laws? by Ward, Barry
1 
 
Why Confirm Laws? 
 
Barry Ward 




We argue that a particular approach to satisfying the broad predictive ambitions of the sciences demands 
law confirmation.  On this approach we confirm non-nomic generalizations by confirming there are no 
actually realized ways of causing disconfirming cases.  This gives causal generalizations a crucial role in 
prediction.  We then show how rational judgements of relevant causal similarity can be used to confirm 
that causal generalizations themselves have no actual disconfirmers, providing a distinctive and clearly 
viable methodology for inductively confirming them.  Finally, we argue that for agents in our epistemic 
position using this methodology to confirm causal generalizations of adequate breadth will commonly 
demand law confirmation.   We make a prima facie assessment of the methodology’s fit with scientific 
practice and briefly consider the prospects for an associated analysis of laws.  
 
 





Many philosophers have given law confirmation a central role in rational induction.  While they 
acknowledge that we can confirm generalizations we hold to be accidental, in the sense that we can raise 
our probability that they are true, we cannot inductively confirm them i.e., raise our probability that 
unexamined cases conform.  We’re merely engaged in content cutting.   
Nelson Goodman (1983, 73) restricts inductive confirmation to lawlike generalizations.  David 
Armstrong (1983, 52-59) and Fred Dretske (1977, 256-258) each offer distinct arguments that rational 
induction must involve confirmation of specifically non-Humean laws.  Plausibly, however, they are 
mistaken.  Elliott Sober, Bas van Fraassen and others, have provided examples that clearly demonstrate 
that we can reasonably inductively confirm accidental generalizations without any appeal to laws.1 
Should we conclude that laws have no distinguished role in prediction?  Perhaps they’re of 
importance for science because they support explanations but play no special role in the formation of 
expectations.  That would be to embrace a false dichotomy: either all rational inductive confirmation must 
involve laws or laws bring nothing distinctive to the table.2 
We shall argue for a different view.  Laws are at least entailed by—and perhaps identical with—
causal generalizations of a certain kind, and so, they may be inductively confirmed by methodologies that 
specifically apply to causal claims.  However, unlike more parochial causal generalizations, laws are fit to 
serve the broadest predictive ambitions of the sciences.  Hence, they merit a distinctive place in our 
understanding of scientific prediction and our confirmation theory. 
 
1 We shall not detail these examples. They are precisely and compactly described in Sober (1988, 95-96) and van 
Fraassen (1989, 136-137).  Salmon (1989, 49) provides an example that’s also compelling, but not so clearly decisive 
as the other two.   
2 Michael Tooley (1987, 135) has argued that confirmation of non-Humean laws is needed to rationally assign non-
zero probability to generalizations with a potentially infinite set of potential disconfirmers based on finite evidence.  
Unlike Armstrong and Dretske he’s not arguing that the formation of any expectations demands appeal to non-Humean 
laws, only those expressed by confidence in such generalizations.  While we don’t agree with Tooley’s argument, it 
illustrates one way the dichotomy might be evaded.  
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Sections 2, 3, and 4 develop the case that laws can play this distinctive role.  Section 5 assesses 
the confirmational story’s fit with scientific practice.  Section 6 briefly assesses the prospects for an 
associated analysis of laws.  
 
2.  The Causal Methodology for Confirming Generalizations 
Our discussion shall be largely qualitative.  However, we’ll also make use of a quantitative, Bayesian 
approach, and we introduce the essential formalism and terminology here.  The probability of a 
hypothesis, h, conditional on evidence, e, and background beliefs, K, is given by Bayes’s theorem: 
 
P(h|e & K) = P(e|h & K) . P(h|K) / P(e|K) 
 
On learning e, an agent updates her personal probability in h from her prior probability, P(h|K), to her 
posterior probability, P(h|e & K).  Thus, e incrementally confirms h, or simply confirms h, relative to K if, 
and only if, P(h|e & K) > P(h|K).  The absolute degree of confirmation of h is just h’s probability. We shall 
say that h is absolutely well confirmed, or just well confirmed, for an agent if she gives h a high probability.  
What counts as a high probability is inevitably vague, and none the worse for that.  We can now proceed. 
When we seek to confirm a generalization for broad predictive use, we ideally seek to well confirm 
it.  If it’s not well confirmed, we’re not highly confident that it’s generally reliable as a predictor.  Of course, 
our predictive ambitions might be restricted to some domain or some degree of approximation or both. 
Nevertheless, even for these more circumscribed predictive goals we ideally seek to well confirm some 
generalization—one that is suitably restricted and/or posits an approximate fit between the predictions 
made and the world.  So, well confirming is a legitimate ideal for generalizations a scientist might rely 
upon for prediction. How might we approach it? 
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So as not to prejudice our discussion, let’s consider a generalization that we’re confident is not a 
law, Reichenbach’s generalization: 
 
All solid spheres of gold have a diameter of less than 1 mile.3 
 
It’s plausibly true.  On what basis do we make that judgement? We haven’t gone looking for large gold 
spheres, and even if they were out there, we couldn’t detect them at intergalactic or even interstellar 
distance scales.  Nor do we need to rely on geological surveys of the Earth’s crust to hold it plausible.  So, 
our methodology doesn’t resemble random sampling or just blindly sampling from the universe at large, 
not even in some highly idealized sense.  To the extent that we have justifiable confidence in the 
generalization’s truth, it’s by other means. 
 We can reason as follows.  We inventory the various kinds of processes that might cause gold 
spheres of diameter of a mile or more and evaluate whether they’re at all likely to be actual. One 
possibility is gravitational accretion.  However, we know the interstellar medium was and is predominantly 
hydrogen, and our knowledge of how stars work—i.e., more causal knowledge, notably that stars do not 
form gold by nuclear fusion in the non-catastrophic parts of their lifecycles—allows us to confidently 
predict that medium will not contain suitably large aggregates of reasonably pure gold in the future either.  
So, gravitational accretion will not cause colossal gold spheres.  Our inventory of possible causal processes 
also includes ones that synthesize gold.  However, the neutron star collisions and supernova explosions in 
which gold is formed by nuclear fusion are incredibly violent and cause the resultant gold to be rapidly 
dispersed.  So, they will not cause colossal gold spheres.  Moreover, we know of no other fundamental 
physical, geophysical, or chemical processes that would remotely likely cause suitably colossal aggregates 
 
3 Van Fraassen (1989, 27, note 12) notes that this example was informally discussed at UCLA in the 1960s, and 
suspects it derives from similar examples due to Reichenbach. 
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of gold of any shape.  Given that we’re confident that our knowledge of the kinds of processes that could 
cause colossal gold spheres is comprehensive, we can rationally well confirm this accidental 
generalization.  
The above methodology, let’s call it the causal methodology, can be justified as follows.  We can 
well confirm a generalization if we can well confirm it has no actual disconfirmers.  We can do that if we 
can individuate a suitably comprehensive set of ways of potentially causing disconfirmers and well confirm 
that set does not yield actual disconfirmers.  As instanced by the above example, that’s something we can 
do.  So, the nomic—broadly construed to include the causal—can play a useful and distinctive role in 
achieving our predictive goals.   
To be clear, we’ve not argued that no possible alternative methodology could do this job. For our 
purposes, it suffices that there’s a clearly rational methodology for well confirming generalizations that 
essentially depends upon causal commitments.   
Now this example does not directly involve induction. We well confirmed Reichenbach’s 
generalization by reasoning from antecedently well confirmed nomic claims and boundary conditions.  
However, since rationally implementing the methodology ultimately demands those nomic claims are well 
confirmed from the scant data that we can gather, it will evidently involve the inductive confirmation of 
nomic claims.  So, we’ve identified a distinctive role for the inductive confirmation of at least one species 
of nomic claim, causal ones, in our pursuit of predictive power.   
We did indeed appeal to several laws, the law of gravitation and—implicitly—those concerning 
the strong nuclear and electromagnetic interactions that cover nuclear fusion.  Both in compiling our 
inventory of the kinds of causal processes that might yield colossal gold spheres and evaluating the 
outcomes of the processes for various boundary conditions we would naturally employ these laws.  
However, while causal beliefs are clearly integral to this methodology—at least for compiling the 
inventory—it’s not evident that laws are.   
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Laws are fit for purpose: if we know the relevant laws and other salient facts, we can infer what 
causes what.  On the other hand, they go beyond the actual, extending to what causes what in all 
nomologically possible cases.  Since our predictive goal merely demands well confirming generalizations 
regarding the actual, it’s reasonable to ask: why invoke laws?   
 
3.  From Confirming Causal Generalizations Regarding Actual Cases to Confirming Laws 
To well confirm Reichenbach’s generalization we invoked nomic generalizations that involve complicated 
causal dependencies. For instance, the gravitational force between a pair of masses causally depends on 
three parameters, the magnitudes of the two masses and the distance between them.  In exploring the 
inductive confirmation of nomic generalizations in service of prediction of the actual, we shall begin with 
a simpler case.  We’ll return to more complex ones later. 
 Suppose we’re entertaining the causal generalization “ignited sodium fluoride causes a yellow 
flame / burns yellow”.  Since our concern is prediction of the actual, we obviously shouldn’t assume that 
we need to confirm that in all nomologically possible cases ignited sodium fluoride burns yellow.  We only 
need well confirm “in all actual cases, ignited sodium fluoride causes a yellow flame”.  Moreover, we 
shouldn’t assume we need to confirm that all actual sodium fluoride is relevantly causally similar i.e., that 
the same feature invariably causes the flame to be yellow.  Sodium fluoride may well occur in different 
forms and even if it should turn out that all indeed burn yellow, different forms might do so for different 
reasons.  Minimally, we need to well confirm “for whatever reasons, in all actual cases, ignited sodium 
fluoride causes a yellow flame”.  How might we do that? 
While we shouldn’t assume all actual sodium fluoride is relevantly causally similar, if we thought 
that claim had some prima facie plausibility, we might reasonably attempt to well confirm it, and thereby, 
well confirm our targeted causal generalization.  Let’s explore this possibility.    
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Presumably, early in our research we’re only acquainted with samples of sodium fluoride that 
burn yellow. However, we recognize that it may actually occur in forms that might relevantly differ.  It 
might occur in different crystal structures, and such differences might cause a different color flame if 
ignited.   It might also occur in a glass form, say, and that variation might be causally relevant to flame 
color.  And so on.  Let’s assume we have an inventory of such sub-kinds of sodium fluoride.  Further, 
assume we’re confident that cases that belong to each such sub-kind are relevantly causally similar—
we’re confident these kinds need not be further subdivided given that our concern is the color of the 
caused flame.  High confidence in relevant causal similarity does not mean being confident that all cases 
of that sub-kind invariably burn yellow—they could all burn green—only that they all burn the same color 
and for the same reason.  However, granted such confidence, an inductively rational agent can well 
confirm that all cases of that sub-kind burn yellow by observing only a modest number of samples that 
uniformly do so.4  In particular, granted high confidence that all cases of the kind actual sodium fluoride 
glass are relevantly casually similar, we can rationally well confirm the causal generalization “being an 
ignited piece of sodium fluoride glass or something generally associated with that causes a yellow flame”.  
Moreover, in well confirming the causal generalization, we thereby well confirm that every unexamined 
case conforms to it.5  So, what we have is a distinctive methodology for inductively confirming specifically 
causal claims.   
Of course, for such confirmation to be rational, we must be able to justify high confidence in the 
relevant causal similarity of cases of that kind.  Can we?  One potential concern can be dismissed.  In 
individuating the different sub-kinds, we’re taking into account every known factor we suspect might be 
causally relevant to actual flame color.  Thus, we account actual sodium fluoride glass as such a sub-kind 
 
4 Inductively rational in the minimal sense that, excepting situations where the agent has very unusual background 
beliefs, merely learning that the samples uniformly burn yellow will not prompt her to lose confidence that all (actual) 
sodium fluoride glass is relevantly causally similar.  
5 On pain of incoherence, the probability of the generalization must be less than or equal to the probability that any 
particular case fails to conform.  
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only if there are no additional known factors that we suspect might undermine relevant causal similarity 
among those cases.  If there were further known factors, then as we already did for (actual) sodium 
fluoride, we would have subdivided actual sodium fluoride glass into kinds individuated by them.  So, 
known factors that could prompt suspicions of relevant causal dissimilarity are not a concern. 
What about unknown factors? Absence of evidence is not generally evidence of absence, but in 
cases where we’ve done due diligence in identifying kinds of factors that might be causally relevant—in 
this case, having done sufficient general chemical research to have identified the kinds of factors that 
might plausibly actually be relevant to flame color—we’re justified in giving little credence to unknown 
causal dependencies we’ve no grounds to suspect.  High confidence in relevant causal similarity when 
we’ve done due diligence is commonplace in inductive reasoning and holding it generally problematic is 
a form of inductive skepticism that would lay waste to the sciences.  Of course, there are numerous 
generalizations for which our background causal knowledge at a time is too impoverished for us to 
individuate kinds for which we’re confident the subsumed cases are relevantly causally similar.  Those are 
generalizations we cannot well confirm using this methodology, at least at that time. We shall assume the 
sodium fluoride generalization, and hence, the sodium fluoride glass generalization, is not one of those. 
Thus far, we’ve detailed how we can rationally well confirm “for whatever reasons, all actual 
ignited sodium fluoride glass causes a yellow flame” by well confirming “being an ignited piece of sodium 
fluoride glass or something generally associated with that causes a yellow flame”.  However, given our 
actual epistemic position, there’s a further consideration.  Sodium fluoride, whether in glass form or not, 
is not confined to the Earth, nor indeed our local group of galaxies, nor any time-slice of our universe we 
might care to individuate.  Since we can’t survey or even randomly sample the entire actual population of 
sodium fluoride glass, we’ve no direct evidence that would allow us to reasonably restrict the set of 
actually occurring additional factors that might cause (some) sodium fluoride glass to burn non-yellow 
beyond those that are nomologically possible.  Thus, absent some kind of esoteric theoretical reason for 
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holding that a nomologically possible sub-kind of sodium fluoride glass just couldn’t be actual, the due 
diligence required to justify judgements of relevant causal similarity is due diligence regarding all 
nomologically possible factors that might be causally relevant: rational confidence that all actual sodium 
fluoride glass is relevantly causally similar demands a similar degree of confidence that all nomologically 
possible sodium fluoride glass is relevantly causally similar.  So, we rationally well confirm the causal 
generalization for actual sodium fluoride glass only if we well confirm “being an ignited piece of sodium 
fluoride glass or something necessarily associated with that causes a yellow flame”. And in well confirming 
that causal generalization we well confirm “it is a law that sodium fluoride glass burns yellow”.  The same 
goes mutatis mutandis for the other causally individuated sub-kinds of sodium fluoride.   
Let’s note that we’re not identifying “being an ignited piece of sodium fluoride glass or something 
necessarily associated with that causes a yellow flame” with “it is a law that sodium fluoride glass burns 
yellow”.  Whether we should and whether we should embrace a corresponding analysis of lawhood are 
concerns we’ll briefly address later, but they’re orthogonal to our primary, confirmational concerns. 
Whatever the prospects for such an analysis, the causal generalization clearly entails the law. Hence, well 
confirming it automatically well confirms the law.6   
Two aspects of our methodology led to law confirmation.  If we’d confirmed that pieces of sodium 
fluoride glass uniformly cause a yellow flame when ignited, but for all we knew they did so for a diversity 
of reasons, then we shouldn’t well confirm the corresponding law.  Indeed, if we knew they did so for a 
diversity of reasons, we should reject it.  Thus, the use of judgements of relevant causal similarity as a 
basis for making inductions was crucial.  The other aspect was imposed by our impoverished epistemic 
position. Since we can’t reasonably rule out the actual occurrence of any nomologically possible factor 
that might cause a sodium fluoride glass to burn non-yellow, confirmation that the causal generalization 
 
6 On pain of incoherence, if f entails y, the probability of y must be greater than or equal to that of f. 
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held for all actual cases demanded we confirm it held for all nomologically possible ones.  Together, these 
led to law confirmation.  
 Of course, our initial target was “for whatever reasons, in all actual cases, ignited sodium fluoride 
causes a yellow flame”.  Unlike the case of sodium fluoride glass where, by hypothesis, we’re antecedently 
confident that all the glass is relevantly causally similar, we’re explicitly concerned that all sodium fluoride 
is not. That’s why we divided it into causally individuated kinds of potential disconfirmers—the glass form, 
the different crystal forms, and so on.  Are we led to confirm a law in this case too? 
A causally individuated kind of Potential Disconfirmer (hereafter, kind of PD) for a given causal 
generalization is a kind for which (i) we have a high degree of confidence that the subsumed cases are 
relevantly causally similar, and (ii) there is a single individuating factor that we believe might be causally 
relevant to the production of disconfirming cases.  To well confirm the causal generalization for sodium 
fluoride, we minimally need to well confirm that each kind of PD could not be a source of disconfirming 
cases.  That is the process we explicitly followed for sodium fluoride glass—one kind of PD for the sodium 
fluoride generalization—that demanded the confirmation of an associated law.  However, for several 
reasons, well confirming a law corresponding to every kind of PD does not inevitably lead to well 
confirming an overarching sodium fluoride law.  
If we could justify holding that some nomologically possible kind of PD is non-actual, we wouldn’t 
need to well confirm the sodium fluoride law to well confirm the causal generalization for actual sodium 
fluoride.   However, just as our actual epistemic position precluded us from restricting actually occurring 
additional factors that might cause non-yellow burning sodium fluoride glass beyond those that are 
nomologically possible, it likely precludes us from excluding any nomologically possible kind of PD from 
actuality.  In any case, we shall assume that to be so. To well confirm the sodium fluoride causal 
generalization, we must include every kind of PD we hold to be nomologically possible in our set of kinds 
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of PDs.  Hence, well confirming the sodium fluoride causal generalization at least demands well confirming 
the corresponding nomological necessity. 
Easier said than done.  We can coherently have high confidence that each member of a set of 
kinds of PDs does not yield disconfirmers but low confidence that the set does not.  As witnessed by the 
Preface paradox, it’s often rational to combine low confidence in a conjunction with high confidence in 
each conjunct.  Moreover, even if we can well confirm the necessity, we won’t well confirm a 
corresponding law if the laws associated with different kinds of PDs support different causal explanations 
of the same behavior.   
For the devotee of law confirmation, there’s a pleasing synergy here—the nomic character of the 
hypotheses in question plays a crucial role.  If we don’t have some good reason to believe that there are 
distinct kinds of causes of yellow burning among the nomologically possible kinds of sodium fluoride, then 
we should be willing to countenance the possibility that all sodium fluoride is relevantly causally similar.  
If we then well confirm that each law holds for each kind of PD, we in effect eliminate all our explicit 
reasons for suspecting that any kind of sodium fluoride in our entire set of kinds of PDs is relevantly 
causally dissimilar. Thus, by something very much like an application of Mill’s (1868) method of 
agreement, we may reasonably be highly confident that all, in fact, are relevantly similar i.e., something 
common to all the sodium fluoride covered in our set of kinds of PDs causes yellow burning.  And since 
that set is the set of nomologically possible kinds of PDs, we thereby well confirm the unified causal 
generalization for all the nomologically possible kinds, and hence, the law.  
At this point, we can clearly see why, for predictive reasons alone, scientists might reasonably be 
interested in confirming laws.  In our epistemic position, if we thought it unlikely that all sodium fluoride 
glass, say, is relevantly causally similar, we’d likely have little reason to expect “all ignited sodium fluoride 
glass causes a yellow flame” to be true, and so, scant reason to research it.  By contrast, if we strongly 
suspect all such glass is relevantly causally similar, we’ve an excellent prima facie reason to suppose that 
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some informative generalization regarding the color with which it burns is true, and moreover, 
confirmable, since high confidence in relevant causal similarity provides a rational basis for making 
inductions from modest data.  So, the scientist’s predictive goals make it reasonable to target broad 
generalizations we strongly suspect subsume cases that are relevantly causally similar; and given our 
epistemic position, only those for which we suspect similarity across all nomologically possible cases i.e., 
suspected laws.  On a grander scale, it makes sense to target “all sodium fluoride burns yellow”, given 
that we suspect—to a more modest degree, given its greater scope—that all sodium fluoride is relevantly 
causally similar across all nomologically possible kinds of cases i.e., again, given that we suspect a 
corresponding law.  As per our discussion, the confirmation of such a broader law is more demanding, and 
the prospect of failure inevitably higher.  Nevertheless, scientists have an excellent predictive motivation 
to confirm laws.  
 
4.  Confirming Laws More Generally  
We shall now consider some tougher cases. We’ll ultimately discuss Newton’s law of gravitation, which 
involves both complex causal dependencies and continuous variables, but we begin with a law that 
subsumes the sodium fluoride one, the law that all sodium salts burn yellow. This might seem like a trivial 
variation. However, it exhibits a practical problem that isn’t present in the sodium fluoride case: there’s a 
limitless array of chemically distinct sodium salts, each of which, at least initially, might reasonably be a 
kind of PD. 
  For instance, you can take any carboxylic acid and treat it with sodium hydroxide to form a sodium 
salt, and there’s an unlimited variety of the former. A carboxylic acid is a molecule with a COOH group 
(i.e., a suitably bonded group consisting of one carbon atom, two oxygens, and one hydrogen) bonded to 
an alkyl, a radical that consists of an alkane (roughly, a molecule of the form CnH2n + 2, for arbitrary integer 
values of n ³ 1) with one hydrogen atom removed. We can’t, even in principle, gather data that 
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individually covers every chemical variant in the family of sodium salts generated by carboxylic acids. So, 
how could we well confirm the sodium salt law that covers this, and indeed, other unlimited families of 
chemically distinct salts? 
Again, rational commitments regarding relevant causal similarity come to our rescue.  The 
similarities between different kinds of alkane molecules and the resultant similarities of the associated 
carboxylic acid molecules give us some reason to suspect the resultant sodium salts might have some 
causal similarities, but they’re insufficient to assume that all will burn similarly.  However, as we gather 
data regarding the increasingly complex sodium salts formed from increasingly complex carboxylic acids, 
and find they invariably burn yellow, at some point we can very reasonably cease to believe that chemical 
differences among that family of sodium salts provide a reason to suspect disconfirmation. That is to say, 
the remaining chemically distinct salts in that family no longer qualify as kinds of PDs, since they no longer 
satisfy condition (ii) for such kinds.  Also, where initially we weren’t confident that all sodium salts in that 
family are relevantly causally similar in regard of color of burning, we can now reasonably be confident 
that they are.  Hence, members of that family now satisfy condition (i).  We’ve consolidated an unlimited 
set of kinds of PDs into one set for which we’re rationally highly confident that the subsumed cases are 
relevantly causally similar, and indeed, given our observations, all burn yellow.7  We might in a similar way 
consolidate the set of kinds of PDs initially associated with sodium salts formed from sulfonic acids, and 
so forth.  More generally, we can practically well confirm a law that, relative to our initial background 
beliefs, subsumes an unlimited variety of kinds of PDs by a series of such consolidations.  An initially 
intractable research program evolves, through unification of kinds, into a manageable one.8 
 
7 Some might think we need not go through this elaborate process to well confirm that sodium salts burn yellow, since 
sodium characteristically burns yellow and one thing all these compounds have in common is a sodium constituent.  
But they would be wrong.  Granted that sodium in isolation burns yellow, we still need evidence that being bonded 
into such molecules doesn’t relevantly affect the sodium, and also, that other parts of the molecules don’t make their 
own differently colored contributions to the resultant flame color.  
8 Such consolidation might be related to a notion of dynamical consilience, although not one subsumed by the model 
in Thagard (1978). 
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We can apply a similar kind of story to Newton’s law of gravitation, F = GMm/r2.  An agent’s set 
of kinds of PDs depends on her background beliefs. For simplicity, assume she thinks only factors 
mentioned in the equation are likely causally relevant to the attractive force between masses i.e., for all 
nomologically possible cases, she is confident that only the values of M, m and r, are relevant.  Further, 
for each triple of values of M, m, and r, she (i) has a high degree of confidence that all cases with the same 
triple of values will cause the same force, but (ii) believes that differences in any of those values might be 
causally relevant to the production of disconfirming cases.  So, for her, each triple of values specifies a 
kind of PD, and observation of a modest number of cases of a given kind for which F is indeed specified 
by Newton’s equation will well confirm that it holds for that kind of PD.  A rational agent may hold that 
well confirming that the law holds for each of a significant variety of her kinds of PD licenses rejecting the 
belief that a novel triple of values provides reason to suspect disconfirmation and become 
correspondingly confident that all such triples are relevantly causally similar. Such an agent consolidates 
her entire set of kinds of PDs into one class of cases for which she’s highly confident that the equation 
holds i.e., she well confirms Newton’s law. 
A rational agent might, of course, be vastly more skeptical.  It will depend upon her background 
beliefs, and we can certainly understand rational disagreement among scientists on this score.  Some 
might have reason to favor consolidation only over some proper subsets of the kinds; and all who resist 
wholesale consolidation will presumably only well confirm that the law holds to some degree of 
approximation in the domains for which they hold it successful—if a law like this is wrong in some cases, 
it’s plausibly wrong in all, or almost all, even if the magnitude of error is often miniscule.  Nevertheless, 
given appropriate background beliefs about potential causal dependencies, we can see how the two 
mechanisms, well confirming laws associated with individual kinds of PDs, and consolidation of kinds of 
PDs via changes of background belief, might accommodate the confirmation of laws that invoke 
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equations.  Such confirmation in this case broadly resembles Mill’s (1868) method of concomitant 
variation. 
We don’t wish to understate the difficulty of law confirmation on this methodology.  Establishing 
highly general scientific claims is difficult. Individual scientists propose laws, but their confirmation is often 
the work of legions over decades or even centuries.  While we might quite rapidly confirm the sodium 
fluoride law, well confirming the sodium salt law demands the accumulation of a wealth of causal 
knowledge regarding an immense variety of forms of sodium salts and other related compounds.  The 
same goes for the variety of interestingly different systems relevant to the law of gravitation.  
Consolidating kinds of PDs renders well confirming such laws a practical possibility, but it may be a very 
long road indeed.   
We’ve only applied our methodology to a few cases but can reasonably be optimistic about its 
extension to others e.g., laws confirmed using something like Mill’s method of difference.  However, we 
clearly can’t attempt a general treatment here. Nor shall we attempt to formalize our methodology.  It 
involves a set of prima facie reasonable, but non-trivial, epistemic transformations, and even if we confine 
ourselves to some species of Bayesianism, we might proceed in multiple ways.9  Our informal account 
suffices to make a compelling case that law confirmation provides an important and distinctive way of 
meeting the predictive goals of science, and we don’t want to give the mistaken impression that our case 
is hostage to the details of some particular, inevitably somewhat tendentious, formalization. 
  
 
9 Notably, the rejection of background beliefs involved in the consolidation of kinds of PDs demands careful treatment, 
since you can’t downgrade a proposition’s probability from 1 by conditionalization.  However, since background 
beliefs commonly get discarded, this is an issue Bayesians must grapple with anyway.  Plausibly, they cannot maintain 
conditionalization as an entirely general policy for updating.  
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5. Relevant Causal Similarity, Law Confirmation, and Scientific Practice 
Does science plausibly proceed in this way?  Scientific theorizing largely involves positing entities we 
suspect might causally explain the observed phenomena—electrons, atoms, molecules, antibodies, 
hormones, psychological states—and associated causal generalizations and laws.  Scientific confirmation 
largely concerns those generalizations, and they’re not stitched together from a patchwork of parochial 
causal claims: they support explanations that go hand in hand with the broad relevant causal similarity 
that underpins our confirmation theory.  And when scientists pursue their broadest predictive ambitions, 
they confirm laws.  So, the primary objects of confirmation in science are of the right kind for our 
methodology.  
Moreover, our confirmation theory also seems a reasonable fit.  A scientist who sought to confirm 
the law that all ravens are black but didn’t recognize the possibility that arctic environments might well 
cause white (hence non-black) ravens as providing a reason to specifically research arctic ravens would 
be obviously incompetent.   Thus, the potential relevant causal dissimilarity that delineates our kinds of 
PDs clearly matters for scientific confirmation.  Further, if we’re not confident that all arctic ravens are 
relevantly causally similar, it’s hard to see how we could make a rational induction regarding their 
blackness based on the observed ones.10  It’s not as if we can literally randomly sample the population of 
arctic ravens, or any population that includes them.  It has countless past and future members that have 
zero probability of being in our sample.  Thus, if we’re to justify holding the population we can sample as 
representative of that total population, and hence legitimately make an induction regarding all the arctic 
ravens being black, we must be confident the total population doesn’t include members that relevantly 
causally differ from those in the sampled population; if we’re not confident of this, we must recognize our 
 
10 Both of these considerations plausibly have implications regarding standard random sampling resolutions of the 
Raven paradox, notwithstanding that such resolutions concern the non-nomic generalization, not the law.  See Ward 
(forthcoming).   
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sample as potentially biased.  So, the judgements of representativeness that are required to legitimately 
apply a random sampling model—or indeed, any reasonable model of an induction regarding the 
blackness of the total population of arctic ravens—are parasitic on our confidence that past and future 
arctic ravens are relevantly causally similar to those we can observe.  The confidence in relevant causal 
similarity that unifies each kind of PD clearly matters for rational induction even in this simple case.  
Moreover, our inability to literally randomly sample the populations of sodium salts and massive objects 
throughout spacetime—and the attendant need for judgements of relevant causal similarity to justify 
judgements of representativeness required for inductions that cover those total populations—is even 
more apparent.  So, there’s a good prima facie case that scientific confirmation commonly involves our 
judgements of relevant causal similarity and potential relevant causal dissimilarity.  
Obviously, this is a cursory assessment.  However, it suffices for a prima facie comparison with 
the accounts of Goodman and the non-Humeans—Armstrong, Dretske, and Tooley.  For them, law 
confirmation is a sui generis mode of induction, one that involves their respective notions of lawlikeness 
and non-Humean necessitation relations, neither of which are manifestly implicated in scientific 
practice.11  On ours, it’s directly integrated with the workaday business of confirming causal claims.  Now, 
it’s not required that scientific practice wear its heart on its sleeve, but other things being equal, an 
account that appeals to manifest features rather than ones that have no evident role, is to be preferred.  
Moreover, barring Tooley (as per footnote 2), they erroneously demand that law confirmation is generally 
required for induction, whereas we recognize our approach as merely providing one inductive 
methodology.  We don’t deny the manifest legitimacy of random sampling as commonly deployed in the 
sciences—and in Sober’s and van Fraassen’s examples (cited in footnote 1)—to inductively confirm 
accidental generalizations. 
 
11 As Lewis (1983, 366) observed, calling something ‘necessitation’ doesn’t make it genuine nomic necessitation any 
more than one can have mighty biceps just by being called ‘Armstrong’.  Similarly, Goodman’s notion of lawlikeness 
should not be casually identified with any notion of law operative in scientific practice.  
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On the other hand, the very considerable attention paid to non-nomic generalizations as opposed 
to laws in twentieth and early twenty-first century confirmation theory should give confirmation theorists 
pause.12  Laws are a primary focus of much scientific activity and we never had strong reasons to suppose 
their nomic character was generally incidental to their confirmation.  So, their largely peripheral status in 
the confirmational literature is certainly odd and may well be a source of considerable misunderstanding 
of scientific practice.  
Indeed, it’s no part of our account that we should expect to find working scientists explicitly 
engaging our initial question of how to well confirm non-nomic generalizations, like Reichenbach’s.  
Science is concerned with predictive comprehensiveness, but since scientists primarily concern 
themselves with nomic claims, its predictive goal will plausibly be addressed by scientists in terms of the 
laws themselves.  Just as our epistemically impoverished position led us to confirm individual laws to 
ensure predictive comprehensiveness regarding actual sodium salts, scientists seek to confirm that the 
world conforms to all the nomologically possible kinds of PDs generated by their entire nomic apparatus.   
In that way they have their guarantee of predictive comprehensiveness, whatever contingencies the vast 
and varied universe might produce. 
Why then begin our discussion with a non-nomic generalization?  Primarily, to persuade 
philosophers that law confirmation can make a distinctive, valuable contribution to prediction.  Further, 
the Reichenbach example served as a simple illustration of our primary methodology for well confirming 
generalizations, whatever their character: considering ways in which disconfirming cases can be caused.  
As subsequently applied to causal generalizations in particular and conjoined with the use of relevant 
causal similarity as a basis for induction, that became our methodology for confirming laws.  
 
12 We don’t have quantitative data for the comparative claim, but a perusal of the mainstream confirmational literature 
will bear it out.  To take one telling example, it’s surely remarkable that there’s no explicit treatment of law 
confirmation in Howson and Urbach’s (2006) fine, and quite comprehensive, text on Bayesian philosophy of science.  
Indeed, the terms “law”, “scientific law”, and “natural law” don’t even appear in the index. 
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6.  The Prospects for an Analysis 
Laws are entailed by the specified causal generalizations and that’s all our confirmational story needs.  We 
could, however, attempt an analysis by identifying them.  Roughly, 
 
A law is a unified causal generalization that invariantly holds for all nomologically possible cases. 
 
Where, by ‘unified’, we mean a causal generalization that subsumes relevantly causally similar cases—the 
feature caused is caused by the same factor(s) in each case.  Such an analysis has prima facie problems.  
It seems circular both in its appeal to the set of nomologically possible cases and its demand that the 
causal generalization would hold for those possibilities, implicitly invoking counterfactuals that are 
commonly taken to be grounded by the laws.  Metaphysicians will also find it crucially incomplete, since 
it analyses laws in terms of causation but gives no account of the latter.  Is the associated ontology 
Humean, non-Humean, grounded in causal powers or dispositions?  It doesn’t say.   
 James Woodward has an analysis that faces similar objections:  
“Laws are generalizations about repeatable relationships that are invariant over variations in initial and 
other sorts of conditions, at least within an appropriate range of such variations—invariant in the sense 
that laws will or would continue to hold under such variations.” 13 
Both Bird (2007) and Psillos (2004) raise both concerns and we can benefit from Woodward’s defense of 
his own project regarding laws and causation more generally.   He characterizes his analysis as a functional 
one: its primary purpose is to illuminate the role that laws play in service of various goals or purposes we 
have.  Such an analysis succeeds insofar as it provides associated insights regarding the kinds of evidence 
 
13 Woodward (2018, 158).  Woodward (2003), (2013), and (2020) provide additional discussion. 
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required to confirm laws and the norms for assessing law claims.14  From the functional perspective, 
circularity and incompleteness are beside the point.  
Our analysis fits the functional template quite well.  We motivated our approach with respect to 
the goal of prediction of the actual, and the result was a substantive—although, obviously incomplete—
prima facie plausible confirmation theory.  Indeed, we’ve some cause to be optimistic about its 
development qua functional analysis.  Contemporary research on causal confirmation is both highly 
sophisticated and flourishing15, and integrating our account of law confirmation with this work is an 
interesting prospect. 
It also illuminates our norms for distinguishing laws from non-laws.  Consider “All solid spheres of 
U-235 have a diameter of less than 1 mile”, an example commonly paired with Reichenbach’s 
generalization to raise problems for naïve regularity analyses of laws.16  Colossal spheres of U-235 cannot 
be caused in any nomologically possible case, and for the same reason—aggregates above critical mass 
would very rapidly explode due to a runaway thermonuclear chain reaction.17  By contrast, suitable 
aggregates of gold would cause colossal spheres by gravitational accretion. So, no corresponding causal 
generalization invariantly holds across all nomologically possible cases.  Further, the reasons a Jupiter-
sized aggregate of hydrogen, say, and a collision of neutron stars would not cause such gold spheres are 
not subsumed under any unified causal generalization: in the former case, the aggregate’s size is 
insufficient to even cause nuclear fusion; in the latter, the violence of the collision causes the gold 
produced by fusion to be extremely rapidly dispersed.   
 
14 Woodward (2014) discusses this approach to causation in detail, contrasting it with other species of analysis. 
Woodward (2018, 166-7, 180) further alludes to it regarding laws in particular. 
15 See, for instance, Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000), Pearl (2009), and a wealth of more recent additions to this 
research program.  
16 See van Fraassen (1989, 27) and numerous other discussions. 
17 Strictly speaking, the U-235 law should be a probabilistic one that specifies the probability of such colossal spheres 
as very close to zero.  A thermonuclear explosion is not guaranteed, but its probability is exceedingly high for any 
nomologically possible formation process.  However, we shall ignore this complication here.  
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The analysis doesn’t just get the right answers in these cases, but does so for the right reasons, 
citing the considerations that would be used by anyone versed in the relevant physics.  Further, in line 
with the functional approach, these normative judgements can be ultimately justified by the 
generalizations’ respective fitness and unfitness for achieving our goal of generally reliable prediction of 
the actual, given our impoverished epistemic state.  As it happens, our current beliefs about relevant 
boundary conditions make it plausible that Reichenbach’s generalization is actually true, but an encounter 
with technologically sophisticated aliens with a perverse interest in very large gold spheres could change 
that.   
What are the prospects for a metaphysical analysis? Woodward (2018, 177-80) strongly suspects 
the metaphysicians’ aspirations are misguided, because the pursuit of truth-makers for laws is an ill-posed 
problem.  We could continue to follow him down the functional road, and it would not be a dead end.  
Developing the analysis by incorporating something along the lines of his (2003) interventionist analysis 
of causal explanation is another interesting prospect.  At the least, it should provide a foil for his analysis 
of laws.  On the other hand, we might attempt to eliminate the incompleteness and circularity by providing 
truth-makers for causal relations and counterfactuals that are not grounded in the laws and analyzing the 
set of nomological possibilities as the set of possibilities that can be caused.  However, even a preliminary 
consideration of such proposals is beyond our current scope. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
There are familiar reasons to care about causal knowledge. It provides effective strategies for 
manipulating the world and facilitates understanding. To this we add another: it provides a distinct 
pathway to broad predictive knowledge.  In one respect, that’s hardly an original observation.  Causal 
generalizations are central to Hume’s epistemology for matters of fact with which we’re not directly 
acquainted.  However, we’ve added three pieces to that story: the causal methodology for well confirming 
22 
 
generalizations, its development into the relevant causal similarity methodology for well confirming 
causal generalizations, and how using this latter methodology to fulfill the sciences’ broadest predictive 
ambitions leads to law confirmation.   
Moreover, in showing how law confirmation can be prosecuted using familiar methodologies we 
apply to causal claims, we’ve domesticated it, largely reducing it to something familiar and 
commonsensical.  No-one can reasonably deny the role of causal inference in daily scientific and folk 
practice.  Why then deny laws their rightful place in our understanding of confirmation? 
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